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I. Introduction
A variety of legal instruments, belonging to different legal systems, contribute to the legal protection of foreign investment. Amongst them, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have played and continue to play a prominent role with regard to both the creation of a stable and predictable normative framework and the settlement of related disputes. This chapter is intended to offer an overview of the main -and in many respects uniquefeatures of BITs. It first describes the disadvantages, advantages and potential of the largely bilateral framework for the protection of foreign investment (Part II). It then examines the special position foreign investors enjoy under these treaties, both in substantive and procedural terms, keeping in mind that foreign investors are manifestly the main beneficiaries of these treaties, yet formally extraneous to the process leading to their conclusion, modification and termination (Part III). Part IV considers how BITs strike a balance between the sovereign prerogatives of States parties and the need to protect the legitimate expectations that these treaties create for foreign investors. Parts V further elaborates on this balancing exercise from the standpoint of the law of treaties.
Part VI and VII are consecrated, respectively, to some issues of interpretation of BITs and the settlement of disputes arising from these treaties. Part VIII touches upon the interaction between BITs and State contracts, including the so-called umbrella clauses. A full discussion of the relationship between BITs and contracts can be found in Chapter VII of this book. Undoubtedly a multilateral treaty has many advantages. First and foremost, it establishes a single legal framework and ensures the greatest simplicity, coherence and uniformity with regard to the rules applicable to the parties. A multilateral treaty, however, does not need to be unduly rigid and contracting parties may accommodate their specific needs through variable geometry, protocols, reservations, opting out mechanisms, optional declarations or in any other manner permitted under the law of treaties. While introducing in the system the necessary degree of flexibility, these devises should not be used excessively -or abused -lest of undermining the integrity of the treaty.
Additionally, multilateral treaties are expected to generate coherent State practice. This is facilitated by the existence of a single set of rules applicable by the entities responsible to implement the treaty within the jurisdictions of all parties to the treaties. State practice can thus consolidate a stable and predictable legal framework, clarify the meaning of the rules contained in the treaty, and possibly contribute to the crystallization or development of customary international law.
From the standpoint of the settlement of disputes, furthermore, the interpretation and application by national courts and investment arbitral tribunals of the same treaty will in all probability reduce the legal uncertainty surrounding investment-related disputes and progressively develop a consistent body of jurisprudence tribunals could comfortably rely upon. The risk of conflicting decisions, being inherent in the sovereign character of international investment tribunals, however, cannot be eliminated simply by adopting a multilateral treaty.
While recognizing all these advantages of multilateral treaties, nevertheless, one should not be unconditionally hostile to BITs as bilateralism is not necessarily less effective or less adequate that multilateralism and in turn offers its own advantages.
In the first place, there is no compelling economic evidence than a multilateral treaty would have a significantly bigger positive impact on the flow of foreign investment than a network of BITs. It must be noted in this respect that recent empirical studies point to a stimulating effect of BITs on the flow of investment towards the concerned States. Apart from the difficulties in determining the link between the conclusion of BITs and the increase in foreign investment, however, it must not be neglected that countries bound by a handle of BITs or no BITs at all -such as Japan or Brazil -have managed to attract remarkable flows of foreign investment.
Second, the current legal framework, however fragmented, works quite well. It is in continuous expansion, even though the conclusion of new BITs has slowed down in the last few years. Additionally, the accuracy, level of sophistication and coherence of the current legal framework progressively improves due the renegotiation of BITs, the elaboration of new model BITs, and the development of a largely consistent body of arbitral decisions.
Third, the framework has a significant potential for improvement with regard to both substantive and procedural rules (for instance, through the inclusion, respectively, of provisions on the protection of human rights and the environment, and of clauses on consolidation 13 and judicial review 14 ).
Forth, the most-favored-nation treatment clause (MFN) contained in the overwhelming majority of modern BITs upgrades the legal protection enjoyed by foreign investors, although the clause works in quite a different manner compared with MFN clauses contained in international trade agreements. 15 Described as a "potent ratchet", 16 especially with regard to the definition of investment, the nationality of the investor, preestablishment treatment, emergency clauses, and, perhaps more prominently, the settlement of disputes.
More than that, it is not uncommon that the provisions of the very same BIT do not apply in a symmetric way to both parties. This may occur with regard to substantive provisions, or, more frequently, the provisions on the settlement of disputes. According to Article II
(1) of the BIT between United States and Argentina, for instance, each party is entitled to maintain or make exceptions to the national treatment obligation in the sectors indicated by each of them in the protocol. An example of asymmetric provisions related to the settlement of disputes can be found in Article 10 (2) of the BIT concluded between The Netherlands and China, according to which China may require Dutch investors to exhaust the domestic administrative review procedure before submitting the dispute to an international investment tribunal.
22
Second, the bilateral nature of these treaties facilitates their modification through protocols, amendments or subsequent practice. Contracting parties may thus alter their obligations in order to meet their evolving financial or economic needs or to keep the rules governing foreign investment in line with the evolution of international law, especially in relation to the protection of the environment, labour standards and human rights.
From this perspective, BITs were traditionally silent on the protection of the environment or contained only broad references to it in preambles. In the last few years, however, contracting parties to BITs have included with increasing frequency provisions on the protection of the environment. 23 These provisions are rather heterogeneous as far as their content is concerned and often drafted in general terms. Moreover, even when they impose sufficiently clear substantive obligations they normally do not fall within the scope of the arbitral clauses. 24 Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that the bilateral 22 See also Ad Article 11 (2) of the Protocol to the BIT concluded between China and Switzerland; (2004) 429, proposes some draft articles that could be inserted in investment treaties in order to recognize and make enforceable the investment-related human rights of nationals of the host State. In line with the scope of application of most human rights treaties, it may even be argued that these remedies should not be confined to nationals of the host State, but be available to those within its jurisdiction of the Host State, regardless to their nationality. At any rate, these remedies could be subjected to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 37 For an example, see Article 9 BIT between China and Switzerland. 38 See below, note 96. and objects. The basic assumption behind this approach is that "there is no inherent reason why the individual should not be able directly to invoke international law and to be the beneficiary of international law".
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Significantly, already in 1928, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that it cannot be disputed that the very object of any international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts.
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The Court pointed out that the individual rights stemming from the treaty could be enforced before national tribunals, although this may require the adoption by the parties of the necessary national legal instruments. 
13
(2) the substantive rules continue to apply exclusively between the Parties, but the related procedural rights in case of disputes are granted to and can be exercised directly by the concerned foreign investor.
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Both alternatives elucidate the real nature of BITs and ultimately lead to the same result. 48 The first alternative, nonetheless, is to be preferred as it realistically describes investment arbitration as "a remedy exercisable by an investor by itself and in its own right against the host state". 49 In a recent case, a tribunal held that in the case of Chapter XI of the NAFTA […] the intention of the Parties was to confer substantive rights directly upon investors. That follows from the language used and is confirmed by the fact that Chapter XI confers procedural rights upon them. The notion that Chapter XI conferred upon investors a right, in their own name and for their own benefit, to institute proceedings to enforce rights which were not theirs but were solely the property of the State of their nationality is counterintuitive.
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It must however be pointed out that under neither alternative referred to above the legal relationship between the States parties to the treaty is disposed of. In both cases, the treaty continues to impose upon the host State primary obligations owed to the other State. Under the first alternative described above, these obligations have an identical content to those owed to the investor, but remain quite independent from them. As such, A third type of clause is a typical conflict clause. Article 7 (2) of the BIT between Canada and Peru, for instance, allows for the adoption of certain measures intended to protect the environment that otherwise would be contrary to treaty obligation, provided that they are non discriminatory. It reads:
[a] measure that requires an investment to use a technology to meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental requirements shall not be construed to be inconsistent with paragraph 1(f) [to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge]. by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. unilateral action of the parties to the treaty. It is worth pointing out that they may lose the protection of a BIT due to the decision of their own national states to terminate it.
From the standpoint of the law of the treaties, the fact that the foreign investor is extraneous to the rule-making process leading to the conclusion, amendment and termination of the treaty calls for some important considerations.
In the first place, the parties to a BIT can at any time amend its content, either formally (i.e. through a protocol) or informally (through subsequent practice). For the purpose of interpreting and applying a provision in the settlement of a given dispute, nonetheless, the amendment cannot produce its effects retroactively, if the rights acquired under the treaty by the foreign investor are to be adequately protected within a stable and predictable legal framework. This makes it indispensable to determine whether the amendment has taken place at the time of the conduct allegedly inconsistent with the BIT.
As pointed out by the Enron and Sempra tribunals with regard to the alleged self-judging 
VI. Interpretation of BITs
Numerous tribunals have held that investment treaties must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of interpretation contained in the VCLT, which reflect customary international law 73 . The applicability of these rules has rarely been challenged by the parties to investment disputes. When this occurred, tribunals discarded the argument. In
RosInvestCo UK Ltd v. Russian Federation, in particular, the Tribunal rejected the Claimant" argument that these rules are no more than a convenient point of reverence and firmly held that the application of these rules is a matter of legal obligation. investment, the control over the company is crucial and may prevail over the formal criteria indicated in the treaty.
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With regard to the interaction between BITs and other rules of international law, two questions must be briefly addressed. On the one hand, BITs cannot be interpreted "in isolation from public international law". 86 Under Article 31 (3) (c) VCLT, the interpreter has to take into account "any relevant rule of international law applicable in the relation between the parties". Article 31 (3) (c) has a huge potential in respect to the interpretation of BITs as the controversial question that has accompanied systemic interpretationnamely whether the relevant rules referred to must be applicable to the parties to the dispute or to the parties to the relevant treaty -does not arise in the context of BITs due to the bilateral character of these treaties.
While the relevance of Article 31 (3) (c) is generally accepted in investment arbitration, 87 it remains that the expression "to take into account" remains rather vague and could mean almost anything. The interpreter is then called to rigorously keep the distinction between applicable law and systemic interpretation. From this perspective, a tribunal has aptly held that Applicable in the relations between the parties" must be taken as a reference to rules of international law that condition the performance of the specific rights and obligations stipulated in the treaty -or else it would amount to a general licence to override the treaty terms that would be quite incompatible with the general spirit of the Vienna Convention as a whole.
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On the other hand, in a few cases investment tribunals have taken into account, for the purpose of interpreting the BIT before them, other BITs concluded by one partynormally the Respondent -or both parties with third States. 89 Given the res inter alios acta character of treaties, reliance on these treaties must be treated with the greatest any of the elements expressly provided for in Article 31 VCLT. In spite of the silence of the VCLT, nevertheless, it may be argued that these treaties could be taken into consideration to elucidate a term or a provision contained in the BIT to be interpreted, but exclusively to the extent they show a clear and consistent pattern in the practice of both parties. Needless to say, such a technique might be impracticable when the concerned
States have ratified a large number of BITs.
VII. Settlement of disputes
Whereas a full treatment of the settlement of disputes related to the interpretation and Tribunal pointed out that "each BIT has its own identity; its very terms should consequently be carefully analyzed for determining the exact scope of consent expressed by its two Parties. This is in particular the case if one considers that striking similarities in the wording of many BITs often dissimulate real differences in the definition of some key concepts, as it may be the case, in particular, for the determination of "investments" or for the precise definition of rights and obligations for each party". 91 In L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v Not all contractual obligations can be brought before a treaty based investment tribunal. It must be stressed that the obligation must be related to the investment. An ordinary contract, such as a contract for the supply of goods, does not fall within the competence of the tribunal. 123 Additionally, the contract must in principle be attributable to the State itself and not to State entities possessing independent legal personality, unless the treaty provides otherwise. It may further be argued that nothing prevent contracting parties from committing themselves to respect, as a matter of treaty law, contracts concluded between these entities.
Claims based on contracts can also reach a treaty-based investment tribunal through socalled umbrella clauses. These clauses are inserted in several BITs and typically guarantee that each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it owns to foreign investments. 124 Since both the wording and the scope of application of these clauses may vary, a carefully interpretation of umbrella clauses on an individual basis is required.
After decades of oblivion, these clauses made a boisterous appearance in ICSID arbitration at the end of 2003. The decisions that followed have not always been consistent and jurisprudence remains unsettled. The interpretation and application of these clauses, as well as the construction of the underlying rights will be discussed in 122 C. Schreuer, "Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims -the Vivendi I detail in Chapter VII of this book. For the purpose of the present chapter, suffice it to note that despite several divergences both in jurisprudence and literature, there is ample agreement that umbrella clauses may cover contractual obligations -the extent of which remains undefined -that could be susceptible of adjudication before treaty-based international investment tribunals. This has been accepted by all tribunals, even those that have adopted a narrow interpretation of these clauses. 125 It remains to explain how this occurs. Two theoretical explanations have been put forward.
According to the first view, these clauses oblige the host State to comply with its contractual obligations lest committing a breach of the treaty which would unavoidably entail its international responsibility and trigger its jurisdictional remedies. Nonetheless, the nature of contractual obligations does not change and remain distinct from the obligations stemming from the treaty. As pointed out by the ad hoc Committee in CMS v.
Argentina,
[t]he effect of the umbrella clause is not to transform the obligation which is relied on into something else; the content of the obligation is unaffected, as is its proper law. If this is so, it would appear that the parties to the obligation (i.e., the persons bound by it and entitled to rely on it) are likewise not changed by reason of the umbrella clause. contrat constitue en même temps la violation du traité ne suffit pas à altérer la nature de l"un ou de l"autre". The debate is however largely academic and of limited practical relevance if it is accepted that under these clauses a treaty-based tribunal is entitled to adjudicate contractual claims. The crux of the matter remains to establish when a contractual obligation falls within the scope an umbrella clause. Again, given the textual differences of umbrella clauses, this must be determined on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the VCLT rules on interpretation.
IX. Concluding remarks
Bilateral investment treaties have played and continue to play a crucial role in the promotion of the rule of law and the development of a stable and predictable legal framework. They are not only there to stay, at least in the near future: they are also quite successful. Their success is due to several factors, including the following.
First, the great flexibility of a bilateral framework allows contracting parties to tailor and adapt treaty provisions in order to meet their own specific and evolving needs. From this perspective, while BITs remain manifestly unbalanced in favour of foreign investors, recent practice shows that some States are prepared to include in BITs provisions on the protection of the environment, thus addressing one of the main sources of criticism of BITs, alongside with the scarce attention paid to human rights and labour standards.
Second, from the standpoint of foreign investors, BITs contain attractive substantive provisions whose effects are amplified by the MFN and NT clauses. BITs have generated a largely coherent body of jurisprudence and had a significant impact on the evolution of customary international law. Yet, inconsistent decisions on BIT claims have been delivered in the past and several issues still remain fraught with uncertainty. The risk of inconsistent decisions, however, is not peculiar to a bilateral framework, but rather inherent in the sovereign character of arbitral tribunals. Considering that the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on investment still appears rather remote and without prejudice to the increasing importance of investment-related provisions in regional economic integration agreements, the real challenge today is how to increase the coherence and effectiveness of the current, largely bilateral legal framework. From this perspective, the potential of BITs is enormous and not fully exploited yet. 128 See, with regard to indirect expropriation, L.Y. Fortier, "Caveat Investor: The Meaning of
